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 ABSTRACT 
 
Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life 
and thought in roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (i.e., like everyone else) 
it fails, in my view, to place his work in proper context and gets some critical points 
wrong. It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair psychology and that W was 
a pioneer in what later became cognitive or evolutionary psychology. One would 
not surmise from this book that he laid out the foundations of the modern concept 
of intentionality (roughly, personality or higher order thought) which has been 
further advanced by many (most notably in philosophy by John Searle in “The 
Construction of Social Reality” and “Rationality in Action”). 
 
There is no clear explanation of how W defined the class of potential actions, which 
he called dispositions or inclinations, (now often called propositional attitudes), 
differentiating them from perceptions, memories and actions and showing how 
they lack truth value. He notes that W spent much of his time discussing the 
foundations of mathematics but fails to provide any explanation as to how this 
relates to his work on language and logic. In fact, as W came to realize, they are all 
names for groups of functions of our innate psychology with many differences and 
none are dependent on the others. It is not really made clear that all our behavior 
depends on the unquestionable axioms of our evolved psychology and thus differs 
totally from the testable empirical facts which they enable us to discover. It is not 
explained that W’s frequent references to “grammar” and to “language games” 
refer to our innate psychology. All these failings are the norm in behavioral studies. 
 
He notes that W described thinking and other dispositions or inclinations (W’s 
terms) -- (i.e., judging, feeling, remembering, believing etc.) -- as behaviors and not 
as mental activities but I don’t see that he really makes it clear that another 
pioneering discovery of W’s was that dispositions describe public actions and 
cannot be mental phenomena for the same reason that he so famously rejected the 
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possibility of a private language. 
 
He repeatedly and correctly notes (e.g., p176) that the core of W’s work is the nature 
of language but (again the universal failing) does not make it clear that language is 
for humans (as opposed to animals) almost coextensive with thought (public 
behavior as W insisted) and thus with our evolved psychology. Like most people, 
philosophers or not, Kanterian has not followed W and taken the final step towards 
understanding and describing behavior from an evolutionary standpoint, the only 
viewpoint that makes sense of it, or indeed of anything. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
 
 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him). 
‘Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not offering the 
chair of physics to Einstein!” I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. 
Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality 
at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like Einstein nearly 
died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a 
difficult personality who published only one early version of his ideas that were 
confused and often    mistaken, but became world famous; completely changed his 
ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new 
work in mostly garbled form diffused slowly  from occasional lectures and students 
notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages  of mostly handwritten 
scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with,  often, no 
clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from 
other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and 
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crossed out words so  that many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary 
executives cut this indigestible mass    into pieces, leaving out what they wished and 
struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences 
which were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works  and that they 
then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a   
century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that 
he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous 
physics was a mistake and even nonsense and that virtually nobody understood his 
work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that 
many physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive 
summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed 
form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse 
topics of modern physics    had only passing and usually erroneous references to him 
and that many omitted him entirely; that  to this day, half a century after his death, 
there were only a handful of people who really grasped    the monumental 
consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with 
Wittgenstein. 
 
Over half a century after his death and after decades of relative neglect (considering 
he is viewed by some as the greatest natural psychologist of all time) Wittgenstein is 
again attracting considerable attention. Though there are hundreds of books dealing 
wholely or in large part with him, few have really grasped his remarkable advances 
in understanding behavior, so this fresh look is most   welcome. 
 
Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life and 
thought in roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (ie, like everyone else) it fails, 
in my view, to place his work in proper context and gets some critical points wrong. 
It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair psychology and that W was a pioneer 
in what later became cognitive or evolutionary psychology. One would not surmise 
from this book that he laid out the foundations of the modern concept of 
intentionality (roughly, personality or higher order thought) which has been further 
advanced by many (most noteably in philosophy by John Searle in “The 
Construction of Social Reality” and “Rationality in Action”). 
 
There is no clear explanation of how W defined the class of potential actions, which 
he called dispositions or inclinations, (now often called propositional attitudes), 
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differentiating them from perceptions, memories and actions and showing how 
they lack truth value.   He notes that W spent much of his time discussing the   
foundations of mathematics but fails to provide any explanation as to how this 
relates to his work on language and logic. In fact, as W came to realize, they are all 
names for groups of functions of our innate psychology with many differences and 
none are dependent on the others. It is not really made clear that all our behavior 
depends on the unquestionable axioms of our evolved psychology and thus differs 
totally from the testable empirical facts which they enable us to discover. It is not 
explained that W’s frequent references to “grammar” and to “language games” 
refer to our innate psychology.  All these failings are the norm in behavioral studies. 
 
Kanterian notes (p41) that in W’s first talk on philosophy, given in 1912 at the age of 
23, he is reported to have said that philosophy is the totality of all propositions that 
are taken as unprovable and basic in science. If one understands that “philosophy” is 
observational psychology, and that “propositions” are sentences which depend for 
intelligibility (truth) on the innate axioms of our psychology, it appears that W 
understood the basic problem of philosophy (behavior), and its answer in what I see 
as the modern two systems of thought, right from the beginning—a feat few have 
accomplished to this day. He again made this crystal clear in a letter to Russell quoted 
by Kanterian (p86) in which he stated that the point of TLP: 
 
“is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions –i.e., by language-(and 
which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by 
propositions, but only shown (gezeigt) which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of 
philosophy. “ 
 
Note also W’s identification of thought with language and his rejection of the idea 
that there is, between language and thought, another entity such as “the language 
of thought”, a point which he discussed directly and indirectly for the next 30 years 
but which still bedevils behavioral literature nearly a century later--another sad 
consequence of the oblivion to one of our greatest teachers. 
 
Kanterian describes the famous distinction in W’s Tractatus between what can be 
said and what can only be shown but does not explain that one can understand this 
in terms of W’s later denotation of the difference between our axiomatic innate 
psychology, which submits to no test (e.g., our System 1 nonlinguistic intentionality 
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such as understanding that this is my hand, I am reading this page etc.), and the 
factual or empirical applications of this evolved axiomatic system (i.e., our System 2 
linguistic intentionality). Perhaps one should not fault Kanterian, since, to my 
knowledge, nobody else has noticed what I regard as this basic and essential 
interpretation of W’s TLP either—though a few have noticed it in his later work. It is 
essential to understand this distinction because any description (following W’s 
frequent injunction that we cannot EXPLAIN but only DESCRIBE our psychology) 
of animal behavior must do so in terms of evolution for the same reasons we must 
describe the genetics, physiology, anatomy and function of the heart in evolutionary 
terms. The alternative “blank slate” view that heart functioning is a matter of one’s 
environment is just as preposterous for the brain. 
 
He does a good job (e.g., p170-171) of describing (as have others, notably Hacker) W’s 
transition from the confusions of TLP to the clarity of his later work, but (again in my 
view following universal practice) does not really grasp that W’s ideas of the “atomic 
facts” and “crystalline logic” that formed the foundations of his TLP world view 
evolved into the notions of an innate axiomatic psychology that he explicated for the 
last 20 years of his life. 
 
He also notes (p80) that by discovering the innateness of “depth grammar” (i.e., our 
inherited psychology that makes language (thought) possible), W anticipated 
Chomsky and others by decades. I noticed this some 40 years ago but I have never 
seen anyone else point it out, so it’s hats off to Kanterian! 
 
With his penetrating understanding of our psychology, W was also prescient about 
larger issues such as the desirability of progress. 
 
“It isn’t absurd... to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of 
the end for humanity; that the idea of great progress is a delusion, along with the idea 
that the truth will ultimately by known; that there is nothing good or desirable about 
scientific knowledge and that mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no 
means obvious that this is not how things are.”) (Kanterian p114 from W’s Culture 
and Value). 
 
Kanterian quotes, without I think fully understanding its implications (again like 
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everyone else so far as I know), another very fundamental discovery by W—our 
natural tendency to subsume all uses of a word or sentence under a single meaning 
rather than recognizing that e.g., “space” is a complex family of uses or concepts 
(language games as W liked to call them) with quite different applications 
(meanings) in our life (our intentional psychology). 
 
He notes that W described thinking and other dispositions or inclinations (W’s   
terms) -- (i.e., judging, feeling, remembering, believing etc.)- as behaviors and not 
as mental activities but I don’t see that he really makes it clear that another 
pioneering discovery of W’s was that dispositions describe public actions and 
cannot be mental phenomena for the same reason that he so famously rejected the 
possibility of a private language. 
 
The probable evolutionary explanation for a route to such usage of disposition words 
seems to me to be that several hundred thousand years ago (give or take) when we 
evolved the ability to vocalize events, objects or actions (i.e., when an animal as agent 
was involved), sentences first substituted for them (get spear, hunt deer) and only 
later became usable in a dispositional or displaced manner (I want you to get the 
spear, I think we will hunt deer soon).   Again, to my knowledge, W was the first to 
point this out in any detail with such examples as how pain language functions (see 
p 182). 
 
Kanterian describes (p174) how W (so famously and notoriously) felt he had put an 
end to philosophy as it was understood and how most philosophers reject this view 
(or more commonly simply ignore it if they are aware of it at all), but his comments 
that  this narrows the range of what we can know by abstract thought and that   
metaphysical questions make no sense, seem to me to completely miss the point.  I   
think W just called our attention to the fact that “knowing” is another set of games 
or psychological functions which we can only accept as they are. Much (we might 
say ALL) of W’s work can be seen as describing how “knowing” works and his last 
writings published as “On Certainty” regarded as the crowning achievement of his 
life (and of 20th century philosophy/psychology). Metaphysical questions have no 
traction because questioning the axioms of our psychology lacks a use in our life (this 
is not “really” my hand, maybe 2+2=4 is not “really” true, perhaps you are not reading 
this page, etc.). Abstract thought (games, music, math, literature, science) is limitless 
but entirely dependent on the axioms. 
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Kanterian is one of the rare persons who gets it correct (p185) that W rejects a 
“language of thought” for the same reason he rejects private languages and   
dispositions such as thinking, believing etc. as mental processes (p 180-183); namely 
that this would make it possible to make systematic mistakes in our “translations” of 
thoughts to actions (e.g., thinking “I want that apple” to saying “I want that apple”) 
which is absurd. A translation could always be wrong and what test could tell us? 
We lack the criteria for correctness. We would then need some test for showing what 
we really thought! I might say “I want the apple” or “I don’t want the apple” and what 
connects that to my thought—even for me?  The words are my thoughts 
(approximately) which are descriptions of acts. 
 
Kanterian also mentions that, in spite of the fact that a large percentage of W’s writing 
concerned the philosophy (i.e., psychology) of mathematics, very little attention is 
paid to his work by most of those writing on the foundations of math over the last 50 
years. Unfortunately, he fails to tell us why. One reason is the nearly universal failure 
to understand what W has done as a result of his originality, style, failure to publish 
and premature death. Another is that it took so long to properly gather, translate and 
edit the 20,000 some pages of his nachlass that several generations have grown up 
without access to the full body of his work. Even to this day some of the German text 
remains untranslated and one of his most famous and largest works—The Big 
Typescript—was only translated and published in 2005.  In addition, many who were 
regarded as   experts on the subject of math and logic (e.g., Dummett, Kreisel, 
Chihara, Godel) totally failed to understand him and much of the writing by others 
on the foundations of math is not about its psychological foundations at all (of which 
they are generally oblivious) but about the details of how math is done. The few who 
have made progress in understanding his mathematical comments have been largely 
ignored (e.g., Gefwert, Shanker) or have published so recently that their work has not 
had time to diffuse (e.g., Rodych, Floyd).  Those interested will find further comments 
and references in my other reviews.  I claim that W’s work on this is continuous with 
the rest of his corpus, and overall, the most original and stimulating ever done. 
 
He repeatedly and correctly notes (e.g., p176) that the core of W’s work is the nature 
of language but (again the universal failing) does not make it clear that language is 
for humans (as opposed to animals) almost coextensive with thought (public 
behavior as W insisted) and thus with our evolved psychology. Like most people, 
philosophers or not, Kanterian has not followed W and taken the final step towards 
understanding and describing behavior from an evolutionary standpoint, the only 
viewpoint that makes sense of it, or indeed of anything. 
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